CRYPTO-DSA
CRYPTO-DSA
参考某位大佬的博客和nss的一些题目，这两天的DSA题目
[NCTF 2021]dsa
task.py
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from secret import flag
from hashlib import sha256
import os
def keygen():
while True:
p = getPrime(522)
q = p//2
if isPrime(q):
break
g = 3
h = long_to_bytes(getPrime(256))
x = int.from_bytes(h*2, "big")
y = pow(g, x, p)
return g, p, q, y, x
def sign(h, x):
k = sha256(h.encode().hex().encode()).digest()+sha256(bytes.fromhex(h)+x.to_bytes(128, "big")).digest()
k = int.from_bytes(k, "big")
r = pow(g,k,p)
s = (r*x+int(h,16))*inverse(k,q)%q
return r, s
g, p, q, y, x = keygen()
flag = int(flag[5:-1],16)^int(sha256(x.to_bytes(128, "big")).hexdigest(),16)
r, s = sign(hex(flag)[2:], x)
print(q)
print(y)
print(flag)
print(r)
print(s)
'''
q=4065074330205980877463463424406813850154275302695361748314870346411329051948044450952905063182483477758495116696164996888846308775044737816809015524088898203
y=7743982251072012463264403932580827621959049035277930304818871889119878506480333248188293037455476433705911511645160292331990658781048396135284434991466243636
flag=19480592192543881131267167328019941277106895469291691207381812905033306766991
r=962433004607153392099715322793248884218264181538005666659905851247468102959956625098831516046715446615198437005036117685792905736788216987378584513020215442
s=1861254747644911591100925843087118347161726578606012243057783788330822542299254180561801871884967022902307837045926190782819951409650425825871898890839825777
'''
\[p=2*q+1
\]
\]
\[x=(2^{256}+1)*d^{'}
\]
\]
据说k是H和H+X的哈希拼接，所以可以知道k的高256位(有没有人能解释的)
\[H=m异或 h(m)\\
\]
\]
\[k=h(H)+h(H+x)=>k=H(2^{256})+h^{'}\\
\]
\]
\[f(x)=(2^{256}H+h^{'})*s-(2^{256+1})*d^{'}*r-H\ (mod\ q)
\]
\]
就是flag的低位和d‘的二元copper
def small_roots(f, bounds, m=1, d=None):
if not d:
d = f.degree()
R = f.base_ring()
N = R.cardinality()
f /= f.coefficients().pop(0)
f = f.change_ring(ZZ)
G = Sequence([], f.parent())
for i in range(m + 1):
base = N ^ (m - i) * f ^ i
for shifts in itertools.product(range(d), repeat=f.nvariables()):
g = base * prod(map(power, f.variables(), shifts))
G.append(g)
B, monomials = G.coefficient_matrix()
monomials = vector(monomials)
factors = [monomial(*bounds) for monomial in monomials]
for i, factor in enumerate(factors):
B.rescale_col(i, factor)
B = B.dense_matrix().LLL()
B = B.change_ring(QQ)
for i, factor in enumerate(factors):
B.rescale_col(i, 1 / factor)
H = Sequence([], f.parent().change_ring(QQ))
for h in filter(None, B * monomials):
H.append(h)
I = H.ideal()
if I.dimension() == -1:
H.pop()
elif I.dimension() == 0:
roots = []
for root in I.variety(ring=ZZ):
root = tuple(R(root[var]) for var in f.variables())
roots.append(root)
return roots
return []
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from hashlib import sha256
import itertools
q = 4065074330205980877463463424406813850154275302695361748314870346411329051948044450952905063182483477758495116696164996888846308775044737816809015524088898203
y = 7743982251072012463264403932580827621959049035277930304818871889119878506480333248188293037455476433705911511645160292331990658781048396135284434991466243636
h = 19480592192543881131267167328019941277106895469291691207381812905033306766991
r = 962433004607153392099715322793248884218264181538005666659905851247468102959956625098831516046715446615198437005036117685792905736788216987378584513020215442
s = 1861254747644911591100925843087118347161726578606012243057783788330822542299254180561801871884967022902307837045926190782819951409650425825871898890839825777
g = 3
p = q*2+1
#sagemath
kmax=int(sha256(hex(h)[2:].encode().hex().encode()).digest().hex(),16)
PR.<h_0, d_0> = PolynomialRing(Zmod(q))
f = (2^256 * kmax + h_0) * s - (2^256 + 1) * d_0 * r - h
roots = small_roots(f, [2^256, 2^256], d=4, m=4)
#roots
kmin = int(roots[0][0])
k = kmax*2^256+kmin
x_ = int(roots[0][1])
x_0 = (2^256+1)*x_
if pow(g,x_0,p) == y:
flag = h^^int(sha256(int(x_0).to_bytes(128, "big")).hexdigest(),16)
print(hex(flag)[2:])
[HZNUCTF 2023 preliminary]easyDSA
task.py
from hash import *
from sage import *
from secrets import flag
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from gmpy2 import invert
def dsa(hmac, _pk, _sk, k):
_p, _q, _g, _y = _pk
x = _sk
r = pow(_g, k, _p) % _q
s = ((hmac + x * r) * invert(k, _q)) % _q
return int(r), int(s)
m = int(flag.hex(), 16)
p = getPrime(2048)
q = getPrime(256)
g = getRandomNBitInteger(2048)
y = pow(g, m, p)
pk = (p, q, g, y)
sk = m
hm1 = int(SM3(default_hm1), 16)
hm2 = int(SM3(default_hm2), 16)
nonce = getPrime(64)
xxxx = getPrime(20)
print(f"(r1, s1) = {dsa(hm1, pk, sk, nonce)}")
print(f"(r2, s2) = {dsa(hm1, pk, sk, nonce ** 2 + xxxx)}")
print(f"p = {p}\nq = {q}\ng = {g}\ny = {y}")
# (r1, s1) = (43665657147136977892760835332544097729763754398125679419859037123212964274095, 11372107439153704547599978617809027960018057676066118055075660375442954789009)
# (r2, s2) = (29184887007213204285288676779168140587575609668559831035949650649308618592275, 5011738292572181542092375902756977363590922060964162373234404450451520414798)
# p = 31961141251107494919420190534228520246958409864267239760354623819192809291490262139213317490432416411403367763443527530375117617196123131270496004125231254335150221348901335274505489844222882171272650010562960614279185073793274638651086760235178963210965828168433516820007716846876686795459738332444629111764967204355463398049697867061034126529189537688874999118692225915790053920062142349951686250122300061810240375783724631961234942175580462986265098353263395579346466921241016500821787793395554444982717141449909744838267161237273856377774256250949274635575801148994817767751541256849860886577256992383324866941911
# q = 69375998045163628324086568160767337544901252262545889505892695427466730978301
# g = 23095306638137759877487469277470910487928442296144598697677211337473146684728707820084075779044942034329888686699655576145455963231144004571165817481066424910959951439014314776050521403558035997997820617824839889597136772108383034876458141163933312284054415480674388788905935457149956424898637134087874179010376667509489926236214865373552518669840236207944772752416668193786003948717604980584661094548997197117467440864460714843246250800575997370964173558788145639802963655916833143883799542309432910222224223561677245110195809587171802538978009246887077924173034608600837785506594525481696000424121705524449481831586
# y = 30195133393879069638917191223585579396119430591488890396938821804398771785068454607425044458865556053274470709839502680269466948174813926392729790863065933078609827279352860810689776644132512095691760326095517755483748554008211568781998662554432781285208646921699265866446498342049913829592480268053599307065979016922204438675164034767731708343084371572648019835171087671868322447023378942812010740490724160077164191297435291229504616686997442254543493394641023587237077429236872101951650325361004443988267286616139798736713430746804524113024341440435623834197278500144543476528466395780355874841379098027115073850819
给了3个文件，主要还是看task.py
关系式
\[s1\equiv (H_1+r_1x)k_1^{-1}\\
\]
\]
\[s2\equiv (H_2+r2x)k_2^{-1}
\]
\]
已知
\[k_2=k_1^{2}+x_0\\
\]
\]
\[H_1=H_2\\
\]
\]
构造二元copper
\[f(x)=(s_2(k_1^2+x_0)-H_2)r_2^{-1}-(s_1k_1-H_1)*r^{-1}
\]
\]
SM3可以直接用在线平台算。
exp
(r1, s1) = (43665657147136977892760835332544097729763754398125679419859037123212964274095, 11372107439153704547599978617809027960018057676066118055075660375442954789009)
(r2, s2) = (29184887007213204285288676779168140587575609668559831035949650649308618592275, 5011738292572181542092375902756977363590922060964162373234404450451520414798)
p = 31961141251107494919420190534228520246958409864267239760354623819192809291490262139213317490432416411403367763443527530375117617196123131270496004125231254335150221348901335274505489844222882171272650010562960614279185073793274638651086760235178963210965828168433516820007716846876686795459738332444629111764967204355463398049697867061034126529189537688874999118692225915790053920062142349951686250122300061810240375783724631961234942175580462986265098353263395579346466921241016500821787793395554444982717141449909744838267161237273856377774256250949274635575801148994817767751541256849860886577256992383324866941911
q = 69375998045163628324086568160767337544901252262545889505892695427466730978301
g = 23095306638137759877487469277470910487928442296144598697677211337473146684728707820084075779044942034329888686699655576145455963231144004571165817481066424910959951439014314776050521403558035997997820617824839889597136772108383034876458141163933312284054415480674388788905935457149956424898637134087874179010376667509489926236214865373552518669840236207944772752416668193786003948717604980584661094548997197117467440864460714843246250800575997370964173558788145639802963655916833143883799542309432910222224223561677245110195809587171802538978009246887077924173034608600837785506594525481696000424121705524449481831586
y = 30195133393879069638917191223585579396119430591488890396938821804398771785068454607425044458865556053274470709839502680269466948174813926392729790863065933078609827279352860810689776644132512095691760326095517755483748554008211568781998662554432781285208646921699265866446498342049913829592480268053599307065979016922204438675164034767731708343084371572648019835171087671868322447023378942812010740490724160077164191297435291229504616686997442254543493394641023587237077429236872101951650325361004443988267286616139798736713430746804524113024341440435623834197278500144543476528466395780355874841379098027115073850819
#!/usr/bin/env python
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from Crypto.Util.number import*
import itertools
IV = 0x7380166f4914b2b9172442d7da8a0600a96f30bc163138aae38dee4db0fb0e4e
default_hm1 = b'HZNUCTFRound#1'
default_hm2 = b'HZNUCTFRound#1'
def small_roots(f, bounds, m=1, d=None):
if not d:
d = f.degree()
R = f.base_ring()
N = R.cardinality()
f /= f.coefficients().pop(0)
f = f.change_ring(ZZ)
G = Sequence([], f.parent())
for i in range(m + 1):
base = N ^ (m - i) * f ^ i
for shifts in itertools.product(range(d), repeat=f.nvariables()):
g = base * prod(map(power, f.variables(), shifts))
G.append(g)
B, monomials = G.coefficient_matrix()
monomials = vector(monomials)
factors = [monomial(*bounds) for monomial in monomials]
for i, factor in enumerate(factors):
B.rescale_col(i, factor)
B = B.dense_matrix().LLL()
B = B.change_ring(QQ)
for i, factor in enumerate(factors):
B.rescale_col(i, 1 / factor)
H = Sequence([], f.parent().change_ring(QQ))
for h in filter(None, B * monomials):
H.append(h)
I = H.ideal()
if I.dimension() == -1:
H.pop()
elif I.dimension() == 0:
roots = []
for root in I.variety(ring=ZZ):
root = tuple(R(root[var]) for var in f.variables())
roots.append(root)
return roots
return []
H1=19905280947443115569469777697852124038269468456842113763109865796452965095134
H2=H1
PR.<k1, x0> = PolynomialRing(Zmod(q))
f = (s2*(k1**2+x0)-H2)*inverse(r2,q)-(s1*k1-H1)*inverse(r1,q)
roots = small_roots(f, (2^64, 2^20), m=1, d=2)
print(roots)
k1,x0=roots[0]
#[(15744441039285451081, 631339)]
k2=k1**2+x0
x = (s1*k1-H1)*inverse(r1,q)%q
print(long_to_bytes(int(x))
[suctf 2019]DSA
在终端里面交互
得到DSA的参数。发现有几组的r相同，于是可以构造方程组求私钥x，把私钥求出来后，将终端给你的签名消息的hash值进行签名，将会得道签名对(r,s)，将签名对与终端交互，得到flag
\[k*s1 = H(m1) + x*r\ mod\ q\\
\]
\]
\[k*s2 = H(m2) + x*r\ mod\ q
\]
\]
exp
import gmpy2
r =645224390501315862797070591755816309562736584452
h_flag = 334436397493699539473999398012751306876
p=89884656743115797097819440555693178620485594490643767510103963471608924587913709653256746790562883588011852460735275267990503465149454718627614453763060059226676569508565322541877120147735776580975577455382906808621021450526077323235477260260610074352985347306411700160496668007768862436197980651598048994217
q=733351900012832584621865112243949059368957476097
g=88493223492302907020961042092534061870813103426197667060896649536511822654652196955971640083365037379740401608129629097454817124374624947279386614844301750312126039698542869587208495662827992222619770171959869103091417006779702356792342825516705379752141737800147265145023116961039150128411592713662148401589
y=52169245435909876495152421578533821340872117742587260268454403838425273037980176268874598797032049946042829131912183461753205871292554332715861109864480014054314530798154726283889479994795350311013632333809929713875409593432791157873854766290466911161859680981529617530940854956585734363116431329106262579369
h1 = 193111848988193367504523557345609960681
h2 = 6552181908429515529989854270507740427
s1 = 624451987004675139546639048435927733971094708317
s2 = 206502049020604103620526858798020639447000006522
ds = s2-s1
dh = h2-h1
k = gmpy2.mul(dh,gmpy2.invert(ds,q))
k = gmpy2.f_mod(k,q)
tmp = gmpy2.mul(k,s1)-h1
x = tmp*gmpy2.invert(r,q)
x = gmpy2.f_mod(x,q)
print(int(x))
s_flag = (gmpy2.invert(k,q)*(h_flag+x*r)) % q
print((r,s_flag))
#(645224390501315862797070591755816309562736584452L, 497133993307905006634015243473843926347603500982L)
[D^3CTF 2022]leak_dsa
task.py
from hashlib import sha256
from secret import flag
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from random import *
import os
from binascii import *
def gen_key(qbit , pbit):
q = getPrime(qbit)
while 1:
p = getrandbits(pbit-qbit)*q + 1
if isPrime(p):
break
while 1:
h = randint(1 , p)
g = pow(h , (p-1)//q , p)
if g != 1:
break
d = randint(1 , q-1)
y = pow(g,d,p)
pubkey = (p ,q , g ,y)
prikey = (p ,q ,g ,y , d)
return pubkey , prikey
def sign(prikey , m):
p,q,g,y,d = prikey
k = randint(1 , q-1)
r = pow(g , k , p) % q
s = inverse(k , q) * (int(sha256(m).hexdigest(),16)+ d * r) % q
return (r , s) , k
def verify(pubkey , m , r ,s ):
p,q,g,y = pubkey
w = inverse(s , q)
u1 = int(sha256(m).hexdigest(),16) * w % q
u2 = r * w % q
if r == pow(g , u1 , p)*pow(y , u2,p)% q:
return 1
return 0
N = 70
pubkey , prikey = gen_key(256 , 2048)
f = open('./cipher.txt' , 'w')
f.write(str(pubkey) + '\n')
for i in range(N):
m = os.urandom(10)
signature , gift = sign(prikey , m)
mask = getrandbits(256)
f.write(hexlify(m).decode() + ',' + str(signature) +',' +str(mask & gift) +','+ str(mask) + '\n')
assert flag[:6] == b'd3ctf{' and flag[-1:] == b'}'
assert flag[6:-1] == sha256(str(prikey[-1]).encode()).hexdigest()
给个链接吧:D^3CTF 2022 - hash_hash - 博客园是一种基于DSA的HNP问题
基于DSA的HNP问题
\[A=s^{-1}\ mod\ q\\
\]
\]
\[B=s^{-1}H\ mod\ q
\]
\]
所以
\[k\equiv Ax+B\ mod\ q
\]
\]
格
\[(t_1 \quad t_2 \quad \ldots \quad t_n \quad x \quad 1)
\begin{pmatrix}
q & 0 & \ldots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & q & \ldots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
0 & 0 & \ldots & q & 0 & 0 \\
A_1 & A_2 & \ldots & A_n & 1 & 0 \\
B_1 & B_2 & \ldots & B_n & 0 & K
\end{pmatrix}
= (k_1 \quad k_2 \quad \ldots \quad k_n \quad x \quad K)
\]
\begin{pmatrix}
q & 0 & \ldots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & q & \ldots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
0 & 0 & \ldots & q & 0 & 0 \\
A_1 & A_2 & \ldots & A_n & 1 & 0 \\
B_1 & B_2 & \ldots & B_n & 0 & K
\end{pmatrix}
= (k_1 \quad k_2 \quad \ldots \quad k_n \quad x \quad K)
\]
当然这是在x不太大的情况下
task.py
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from Crypto.PublicKey import DSA
import random
import hashlib
def gen_key():
pri = getPrime(128)
pub = pow(g,pri,p)
return pri,pub
def sign(m,pri):
k = getPrime(128)
H = int(hashlib.sha256(m).hexdigest(),16)
r = pow(g,k,p) % q
s = pow(k,-1,q) * (H + pri * r) % q
return r,s
key = DSA.generate(1024)
p, q, g = key.p, key.q, key.g
pri, pub = gen_key()
print(f"p = {p}")
print(f"q = {q}")
print(f"g = {g}")
print(f"pub = {pub}")
flag = "flag{" + hashlib.sha256(str(pri).encode()).hexdigest() + "}"
for i in range(5):
r,s = sign(str(i).encode(),pri)
print(f"r = {r}")
print(f"s = {s}")
"""
p =
q =
g =
pub =
r =
s =
r =
s =
r =
s =
r =
s =
r =
s =
"""
这有五组签名对
import hashlib
from Crypto.Util.number import *
p =
q =
g =
pub =
R = [,,,,]
S = [,,,,]
H = [int(hashlib.sha256(str(i).encode()).hexdigest(),16) for i in range(5)]
A = [inverse(S[i],q) * R[i] % q for i in range(5)]
B = [inverse(S[i],q) * H[i] % q for i in range(5)]
n = len(A)
K = 2^128
Ge = Matrix(ZZ,n+2,n+2)
for i in range(n):
Ge[i,i] = q
Ge[-2,i] = A[i]
Ge[-1,i] = B[i]
Ge[-2,-2] = 1
Ge[-1,-1] = K
for line in Ge.LLL():
if line[-1] == K:
x = line[-2]
print(f"x = {x}")
flag = "flag{" + hashlib.sha256(str(x).encode()).hexdigest() + "}"
print(flag)
消元x
当x数量级比较大的时候
\[s_i\equiv k_i^{-1}(H_i+xr_i)\ mod\ q\\
\]
\]
\[k_is_i\equiv H_i+xr_i\ mod\ q
\]
\]
取另外一组签名消去x得到
\[k_is_ir_j\equiv H_rr_j+xr_ir_j\ mod\ q\\
\]
\]
\[k_js_jr_i\equiv H_jr_i+xr_jr_i\ mod\ q
\]
\]
相减得
\[s_ir_jk_i-s_jr_ik_j\equiv H_ir_j-H_jr_i\ mod\ q
\]
\]
取j=0
\[(s_ir_0)k_i-(s_0r_i)k_0\equiv H_ir_0-H_0r_i\ mod\ q
\]
\]
乘以\((r_0s_i)^{-1}\)得到
\[k_i-(r_0s_i)^{-1}(s_0r_i)k_0\equiv (r_0s_i)^{-1}(H_ir_0-H_0r_i)\ mod\ q
\]
\]
\[k_i\equiv A_ik_0+B_i\ mod\ q
\]
\]
有点像LCG的HNP
\[(t_1 \quad t_2 \quad \ldots \quad t_n \quad k_0\quad 1)
\begin{pmatrix}
q & 0 & \ldots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & q & \ldots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
0 & 0 & \ldots & q & 0 & 0 \\
A_1 & A_2 & \ldots & A_n & 1 & 0 \\
B_1 & B_2 & \ldots & B_n & 0 & K
\end{pmatrix}
= (k_1 \quad k_2 \quad \ldots \quad k_n \quad k_0 \quad K)
\]
\begin{pmatrix}
q & 0 & \ldots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & q & \ldots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
0 & 0 & \ldots & q & 0 & 0 \\
A_1 & A_2 & \ldots & A_n & 1 & 0 \\
B_1 & B_2 & \ldots & B_n & 0 & K
\end{pmatrix}
= (k_1 \quad k_2 \quad \ldots \quad k_n \quad k_0 \quad K)
\]
春秋杯——signature
task.py
import os
import hashlib
from Crypto.Util.number import *
from Crypto.PublicKey import DSA
import random
def gen_proof_key():
password = 'happy_the_year_of_loong'
getin = ''
for i in password:
if random.randint(0, 1):
getin += i.lower()
else:
getin += i.upper()
ans = hashlib.sha256(getin.encode()).hexdigest()
return getin,ans
def gen_key():
pri = random.randint(2,q - 2)
pub = pow(g,pri,p)
return pri,pub
def sign(m,pri):
k = int(hashlib.md5(os.urandom(20)).hexdigest(),16)
H = int(hashlib.sha256(m).hexdigest(),16)
r = pow(g,k,p) % q
s = pow(k,-1,q) * (H + pri * r) % q
return r,s
def verify(pub,m,signature):
r,s = signature
if r <= 0 or r >= q or s <= 0 or s >= q:
return False
w = pow(s,-1,q)
H = int(hashlib.sha256(m).hexdigest(),16)
u1 = H * w % q
u2 = r * w % q
v = (pow(g,u1,p) * pow(pub,u2,p) % p) % q
return v == r
def login():
print('Hello sir,Plz login first')
menu = '''
1.sign
2.verify
3.get my key
'''
times = 8
while True:
print(menu)
if times < 0:
print('Timeout!')
return False
choice = int(input('>'))
if choice == 1:
name = input('Username:').encode()
if b'admin' in name:
print('Get out!')
return False
r,s = sign(name,pri)
print(f'This is your signature -- > {r},{s}')
times -= 1
elif choice == 2:
print('Sure,Plz input your signature')
print(pri)
r = int(input('r:'))
s = int(input('s:'))
if verify(pub,b'admin',(r,s)) == True:
print('login success!')
return True
else:
print('you are not admin')
return False
elif choice == 3:
print(f'Oh,your key is {(p,q,g)}')
getin,ans = gen_proof_key()
print(f'Your gift --> {ans[:6]}')
your_token = input('Plz input your token\n>')
if your_token != getin:
print('Get out!')
exit(0)
key = DSA.generate(1024)
p, q, g = key.p, key.q, key.g
pri, pub = gen_key()
if login() == False:
exit(0)
print(open('/flag','r').read())
开始就是一段字符串的大小写混淆，它给了我们hash值，于是我们暴破，直到hash值一样。
接着就是得到DSA的参数p,q,g，我们有8次获得签名对的机会。
然后利用这8组造格
import hashlib
import itertools
from tqdm import *
from pwn import *
from Crypto.Util.number import *
def pass_proof(head):
password = 'happytheyearofloong'
table = itertools.product([0,1],repeat=19)
for i in tqdm(table):
getin = ""
for j in range(len(i)):
if i[j] == 0:
getin += password[j].lower()
else:
getin += password[j].upper()
msg = getin[:5] + "_" + getin[5:8] + "_" + getin[8:12] + "_" + getin[12:14] + "_" + getin[14:]
h = hashlib.sha256(msg.encode()).hexdigest()
if h[:6] == head:
print(msg)
return msg
sh = remote("8.147.132.12",41792)
head = sh.recvline().strip().decode().split(" ")[-1]
msg = pass_proof(head)
sh.recvuntil(b"Plz input your token")
sh.sendlineafter(b">",msg.encode())
sh.recvuntil(b"3.get my key\n")
sh.sendlineafter(b">",b"3")
(p,q,g) = eval(sh.recvline().strip().decode().split("Oh,your key is ")[-1])
H = []
R = []
S = []
for i in range(8):
name = b"a"*(i+1)
sh.recvuntil(b"3.get my key\n")
sh.sendlineafter(b">",b"1")
sh.sendlineafter(b"Username:",name)
data = sh.recvline().strip().decode()
print(data)
r = int(data.split(" ")[-1].split(',')[0])
s = int(data.split(" ")[-1].split(',')[1])
h = int(hashlib.sha256(name).hexdigest(),16)
R.append(r)
S.append(s)
H.append(h)
def get_k():
n = len(R)
r0 = R[0]
h0 = H[0]
s0 = S[0]
A = []
B = []
for i in range(n):
a = inverse((r0 * S[i]),q) * (R[i] * s0) % q
b = inverse((r0 * S[i]),q) * (H[i]*r0 - h0 * R[i])
A.append(a)
B.append(b)
Ge = Matrix(ZZ,n+2,n+2)
for i in range(n):
Ge[i,i] = q
Ge[-2,i] = A[i]
Ge[-1,i] = B[i]
K = 2**128
Ge[-2,-2] = 1
Ge[-1,-1] = K
for line in Ge.LLL():
if abs(line[-1]) == K:
return line[-2]
k0 = get_k()
print(f"k0 = {k0}")
sh.recvuntil(b"3.get my key\n")
sh.sendlineafter(b">",b"2")
sh.recvline()
x = int(sh.recvline().strip().decode())
r = pow(g,k0,p) % q
hh = int(hashlib.sha256(b"admin").hexdigest(),16)
s = pow(k0,-1,q) * (hh + x*r) % q
sh.sendlineafter(b"r:",str(r).encode())
sh.sendlineafter(b"s:",str(s).encode())
print(sh.recvline().strip().decode())
print(sh.recvline().strip().decode())
给出k的高位
k写成\(k=2^hk_h+k_{un}2^l+k_l\)
一系列化简得到，\(A_i\equiv (s_ir_02^l)^{-1}(s_0r_i2^l)k_{0un}\ mod\ q\)
\(B_i\equiv (s_ir_02^l)^{-1}(H_ir_0-H_0r_i+(s_0r_i)(k_{0h}2^h+k_{0l})-(s_ir_0)(k_{ih}2^h+k_{il}))\ mod\ q\)
\[k_{iun}\equiv A_ik_{0un}+B_i\ mod\ q
\]
\]
\[(t_1 \quad t_2 \quad \ldots \quad t_n \quad k_{0un}\quad 1)
\begin{pmatrix}
q & 0 & \ldots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & q & \ldots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
0 & 0 & \ldots & q & 0 & 0 \\
A_1 & A_2 & \ldots & A_n & 1 & 0 \\
B_1 & B_2 & \ldots & B_n & 0 & K
\end{pmatrix}
= (k_{1un} \quad k_{2un} \quad \ldots \quad k_{nun} \quad k_{0un} \quad K)
\]
\begin{pmatrix}
q & 0 & \ldots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
0 & q & \ldots & 0 & 0 & 0 \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\
0 & 0 & \ldots & q & 0 & 0 \\
A_1 & A_2 & \ldots & A_n & 1 & 0 \\
B_1 & B_2 & \ldots & B_n & 0 & K
\end{pmatrix}
= (k_{1un} \quad k_{2un} \quad \ldots \quad k_{nun} \quad k_{0un} \quad K)
\]
2024RCTF——SignSystem
task.py
from random import getrandbits, randint
from Crypto.Util.number import getPrime, isPrime, inverse
from hashlib import sha1
import signal
def gen(l, n):
q = getPrime(l)
while True:
t = getrandbits(n - l)
p = t * q + 1
if isPrime(p):
break
h = randint(1, p - 1)
g = pow(h, t, p)
x = randint(1, q)
y = pow(g, x, p)
return (p, q, g, y), x
def gen_ephemeral_key(k, lsb, msb):
return msb << (k + lsb.bit_length()) | getrandbits(k) << lsb.bit_length() | lsb
def sign(pubkey, x, msg, lsb, msb):
p, q, g, y = pubkey
k = gen_ephemeral_key(150, lsb, msb)
r = pow(g, k, p) % q
Hm = int(sha1(msg).hexdigest(), 16)
s = (Hm + x * r) * inverse(k, q) % q
return (r, s)
def verify(pubkey, sig, msg):
p, q, g, y = pubkey
r, s = sig
if not 0 < r < q or not 0 < s < q:
return False
w = inverse(s, q)
Hm = int(sha1(msg).hexdigest(), 16)
u1 = Hm * w % q
u2 = r * w % q
v = pow(g, u1, p) * pow(y, u2, p) % p % q
return v == r
signal.alarm(900)
with open("flag.txt", "r") as f:
flag = f.read()
l, n = 160, 1024
pub, x = gen(l, n)
print("your pubKey: {}".format(pub))
msb = getrandbits(8)
lsb = getrandbits(2)
menu = """
[1] sign message
[2] verify signature
"""
for i in range(20):
print(menu)
op = int(input(">").strip())
if op == 1:
msg = input("Which message to sign?: ").strip().encode()
if msg == b"get flag":
print("I'm afraid I can't do that.")
break
else:
sig = sign(pub, x, msg, lsb, msb)
print(f"Signature: {sig}")
elif op == 2:
msg = input("Which message to verify?: ").strip().encode()
r = int(input("r:").strip())
s = int(input("s:").strip())
v = verify(pub, (r, s), msg)
if v and msg == b"get flag":
print(flag)
else:
print(v)
else:
print("Invalid option")
可以知道，每个k的高8位和低2位是一样的。
exp
from Crypto.Util.number import *
import string
from pwn import *
from sage.all import *
from tqdm import *
import gmpy2
import time
table = string.ascii_lowercase
host = '' #ip地址
port = #端口
sh = remote(host,port) #建立连接
sh.recvuntil(b"your pubKey:")
pub = eval(sh.recvline().decode().strip())
p,q,g,y = pub
R=[]
H=[]
S=[]
for i in range(19):
sh.recvuntil(b">")
sh.sendline(b"1")
sh.recvuntil(b"Which message to sign?:")
m="".join(choices(table,k=16))
msg=m.encode()
sh.sendline(msg)
sh.recvuntil(b"Signature:")
data1=eval(sh.recvline().decode().strip())
r,s=data1
S.append(s)
R.append(r)
H.append(h)
r0=R[0]
s0=S[0]
h0=H[0]
def sign(pubkey, x, msg, lsb, msb):
p, q, g, y = pubkey
k = gen_ephemeral_key(150, lsb, msb)
r = pow(g, k, p) % q
Hm = int(sha1(msg).hexdigest(), 16)
s = (Hm + x * r) * inverse(k, q) % q
return (r, s)
for high in trange(256):
for low in range(4):
lowbit=low.bit_length()
A=[]
B=[]
tt=2**lowbit
for i in range(1,len(R)):
a=s0*R[i]*tt*gmpy2.invert(tt*t0*S[i],q)%q
b=gmpy2.invert(S[i]*r0*2**lowbit,q)*(H[i]*r0-h0*R[i]+(s0*R[i])*(high*2**512+low)-r0*S[i]*(high*2*2**512+low))%q
A.append(a)
B.append(b)
n=len(A)
Ge=Matrix(ZZ,n+2,n+2)
for i in range(n):
Ge[i,i]=q
Ge[-2,i]=A[i]
Ge[-1,i]=B[i]
K=2**150
Ge[-2,-2]=1
Ge=[-1,-1]=K
for line in Ge.BKZ(block_size=30):
if abs(line[-1])==K:
k0_unknown=line[-2]
k0 = high*2**152 + k0_unknown*tt + low
d = (k0 * s0 - h0) * gmpy2.invert(r0,q) % q
if pow(g,d,p) == y:
print(1)
sig = sign(pub,d,b"get flag",k0)
r,s = sig
sh.recvuntil(b">")
sh.sendline(b"2")
sh.recvuntil(b"Which message to verify?: ")
sh.sendlineafter(b"r:",str(r).encode())
sh.sendlineafter(b"s:",str(s).encode())
print(sh.recvline())
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