SM9-密钥封装
算法过程
代码实现
///************************************************************************
// File name: SM9_Key_encap.c
// Version: SM9_Key_encap_V1.0
// Date: Jan 11,2017
// Description: implementation of SM9 Key encapsulation mechanism
// all operations based on BN curve line function
// Function List:
// 1.bytes128_to_ecn2 //convert 128 bytes into ecn2
// 2.zzn12_ElementPrint //print all element of struct zzn12
// 3.LinkCharZzn12 //link two different types(unsigned char and zzn12)to one(unsigned char)
// 4.Test_Point //test if the given point is on SM9 curve
// 5.SM9_H1 //function H1 in SM9 standard 5.4.2.2
// 6.SM9_Init //initiate SM9 curve
// 7.SM9_GenerateEncryptKey //generate encrypted private and public key
// 8.SM9_Key_Encap //Key encapsulation
// 9.SM9_Key_Decap //Key decapsulation
// 10.SM9_SelfCheck() //SM9 slef-check
//
// Notes:
// This SM9 implementation source code can be used for academic, non-profit making or non-commercial use only.
// This SM9 implementation is created on MIRACL. SM9 implementation source code provider does not provide MIRACL library, MIRACL license or any permission to use MIRACL library. Any commercial use of MIRACL requires a license which may be obtained from Shamus Software Ltd. //**************************************************************************/ #include "SM9_Key_encap.h"
#include "kdf.h" /****************************************************************
Function: bytes128_to_ecn2
Description: convert 128 bytes into ecn2
Calls: MIRACL functions
Called By: SM9_Init,SM9_Key_decap
Input: Ppubs[]
Output: ecn2 *res
Return: FALSE: execution error
TRUE: execute correctly
Others:
****************************************************************/
BOOL bytes128_to_ecn2(unsigned char Ppubs[],ecn2 *res)
{
zzn2 x, y;
big a,b;
ecn2 r;
r.x.a=mirvar(0);r.x.b=mirvar(0);
r.y.a=mirvar(0);r.y.b=mirvar(0);
r.z.a=mirvar(0);r.z.b=mirvar(0);
r.marker=MR_EPOINT_INFINITY; x.a=mirvar(0);x.b=mirvar(0);
y.a=mirvar(0);y.b=mirvar(0);
a=mirvar(0);b=mirvar(0); bytes_to_big(BNLEN,Ppubs,b);
bytes_to_big(BNLEN,Ppubs+BNLEN,a);
zzn2_from_bigs(a,b,&x);
bytes_to_big(BNLEN,Ppubs+BNLEN*2,b);
bytes_to_big(BNLEN,Ppubs+BNLEN*3,a);
zzn2_from_bigs(a,b,&y); return ecn2_set( &x,&y,res);
}
/****************************************************************
Function: zzn12_ElementPrint
Description: print all elements of struct zzn12
Calls: MIRACL functions
Called By: SM9_Key_encap,SM9_Key_decap
Input: zzn12 x
Output: NULL
Return: NULL
Others:
****************************************************************/
void zzn12_ElementPrint(zzn12 x)
{
big tmp;
tmp=mirvar(0); redc(x.c.b.b,tmp);cotnum(tmp,stdout);
redc(x.c.b.a,tmp);cotnum(tmp,stdout);
redc(x.c.a.b,tmp);cotnum(tmp,stdout);
redc(x.c.a.a,tmp);cotnum(tmp,stdout);
redc(x.b.b.b,tmp);cotnum(tmp,stdout);
redc(x.b.b.a,tmp);cotnum(tmp,stdout);
redc(x.b.a.b,tmp);cotnum(tmp,stdout);
redc(x.b.a.a,tmp);cotnum(tmp,stdout);
redc(x.a.b.b,tmp);cotnum(tmp,stdout);
redc(x.a.b.a,tmp);cotnum(tmp,stdout);
redc(x.a.a.b,tmp);cotnum(tmp,stdout);
redc(x.a.a.a,tmp);cotnum(tmp,stdout);
} /****************************************************************
Function: LinkCharZzn12
Description: link two different types(unsigned char and zzn12)to one(unsigned char)
Calls: MIRACL functions
Called By: SM9_Key_encap,SM9_Key_decap
Input: message:
len: length of message
w: zzn12 element
Output: Z: the characters array stored message and w
Zlen: length of Z
Return: NULL
Others:
****************************************************************/
void LinkCharZzn12(unsigned char *message,int len,zzn12 w,unsigned char *Z,int Zlen)
{
big tmp; tmp=mirvar(0); memcpy(Z,message,len);
redc(w.c.b.b,tmp);big_to_bytes(BNLEN,tmp,Z+len,1);
redc(w.c.b.a,tmp);big_to_bytes(BNLEN,tmp,Z+len+BNLEN,1);
redc(w.c.a.b,tmp);big_to_bytes(BNLEN,tmp,Z+len+BNLEN*2,1);
redc(w.c.a.a,tmp);big_to_bytes(BNLEN,tmp,Z+len+BNLEN*3,1);
redc(w.b.b.b,tmp);big_to_bytes(BNLEN,tmp,Z+len+BNLEN*4,1);
redc(w.b.b.a,tmp);big_to_bytes(BNLEN,tmp,Z+len+BNLEN*5,1);
redc(w.b.a.b,tmp);big_to_bytes(BNLEN,tmp,Z+len+BNLEN*6,1);
redc(w.b.a.a,tmp);big_to_bytes(BNLEN,tmp,Z+len+BNLEN*7,1);
redc(w.a.b.b,tmp);big_to_bytes(BNLEN,tmp,Z+len+BNLEN*8,1);
redc(w.a.b.a,tmp);big_to_bytes(BNLEN,tmp,Z+len+BNLEN*9,1);
redc(w.a.a.b,tmp);big_to_bytes(BNLEN,tmp,Z+len+BNLEN*10,1);
redc(w.a.a.a,tmp);big_to_bytes(BNLEN,tmp,Z+len+BNLEN*11,1);
} /****************************************************************
Function: Test_Point
Description: test if the given point is on SM9 curve
Calls: MIRACL functions
Called By: SM9_Key_decap
Input: point
Output: null
Return: 0: success
1: not a valid point on curve
Others:
****************************************************************/
int Test_Point(epoint* point)
{
big x,y,x_3,tmp;
epoint *buf; x=mirvar(0); y=mirvar(0);
x_3=mirvar(0);
tmp=mirvar(0);
buf=epoint_init(); //test if y^2=x^3+b
epoint_get(point,x,y);
power (x, 3, para_q, x_3); //x_3=x^3 mod p
multiply (x, para_a,x);
divide (x, para_q, tmp);
add(x_3,x,x); //x=x^3+ax+b
add(x,para_b,x);
divide(x,para_q,tmp); //x=x^3+ax+b mod p
power (y, 2,para_q, y); //y=y^2 mod p
if(mr_compare(x,y)!=0)
return 1; //test infinity
ecurve_mult(N,point,buf);
if(point_at_infinity(buf)==FALSE)
return 1; return 0;
} /****************************************************************
Function: SM9_H1
Description: function H1 in SM9 standard 5.4.2.2
Calls: MIRACL functions,SM3_KDF
Called By: SM9_GenerateEncryptKey,SM9_Key_encap
Input: Z:
Zlen:the length of Z
n:Frobniues constant X
Output: h1=H1(Z,Zlen)
Return: 0: success;
1: asking for memory error
Others:
****************************************************************/
int SM9_H1(unsigned char Z[],int Zlen,big n,big h1)
{
int hlen,i,ZHlen;
big hh,i256,tmp,n1;
unsigned char *ZH=NULL,*ha=NULL; hh=mirvar(0);i256=mirvar(0);
tmp=mirvar(0);n1=mirvar(0);
convert(1,i256);
ZHlen=Zlen+1; hlen=(int)ceil((5.0*logb2(n))/32.0);
decr(n,1,n1);
ZH=(char *)malloc(sizeof(char)*(ZHlen+1));
if(ZH==NULL) return SM9_ASK_MEMORY_ERR;
memcpy(ZH+1,Z,Zlen);
ZH[0]=0x01;
ha=(char *)malloc(sizeof(char)*(hlen+1));
if(ha==NULL) return SM9_ASK_MEMORY_ERR;
SM3_KDF(ZH,ZHlen,hlen,ha); for(i=hlen-1;i>=0;i--)//key[从大到小]
{
premult(i256,ha[i],tmp);
add(hh,tmp,hh);
premult(i256,256,i256);
divide(i256,n1,tmp);
divide(hh,n1,tmp);
}
incr(hh,1,h1);
free(ZH);free(ha);
return 0;
} /****************************************************************
Function: SM9_Init
Description: Initiate SM9 curve
Calls: MIRACL functions
Called By: SM9_SelfCheck
Input: null
Output: null
Return: 0: success;
5: base point P1 error
6: base point P2 error
Others:
****************************************************************/
int SM9_Init()
{
big P1_x, P1_y; para_q=mirvar(0);N=mirvar(0);
P1_x=mirvar(0); P1_y=mirvar(0);
para_a=mirvar(0);
para_b=mirvar(0);para_t=mirvar(0);
X.a=mirvar(0); X.b=mirvar(0);
P2.x.a=mirvar(0);P2.x.b=mirvar(0);
P2.y.a=mirvar(0);P2.y.b=mirvar(0);
P2.z.a=mirvar(0);P2.z.b=mirvar(0);
P2.marker=MR_EPOINT_INFINITY; P1=epoint_init();
bytes_to_big(BNLEN,SM9_q,para_q);
bytes_to_big(BNLEN,SM9_P1x,P1_x);
bytes_to_big(BNLEN,SM9_P1y,P1_y);
bytes_to_big(BNLEN,SM9_a,para_a);
bytes_to_big(BNLEN,SM9_b,para_b);
bytes_to_big(BNLEN,SM9_N,N);
bytes_to_big(BNLEN,SM9_t,para_t); mip->TWIST=MR_SEXTIC_M;
ecurve_init(para_a,para_b,para_q,MR_PROJECTIVE); //Initialises GF(q) elliptic curve
//MR_PROJECTIVE specifying projective coordinates if(!epoint_set(P1_x,P1_y,0,P1)) return SM9_G1BASEPOINT_SET_ERR; if(!(bytes128_to_ecn2(SM9_P2,&P2))) return SM9_G2BASEPOINT_SET_ERR;
set_frobenius_constant(&X); return 0;
} /***************************************************************
Function: SM9_GenerateEncryptKey
Description: Generate encryption keys(public key and private key)
Calls: MIRACL functions,SM9_H1,xgcd
Called By: SM9_SelfCheck
Input: hid:0x02
ID:identification
IDlen:the length of ID
ke:master private key used to generate encryption public key and private key
Output: Ppubs:encryption public key
deB: encryption private key
Return: 0: success;
1: asking for memory error
Others:
****************************************************************/
int SM9_GenerateEncryptKey(unsigned char hid[],unsigned char *ID,int IDlen,big ke,unsigned char Ppubs[],unsigned char deB[])
{
big h1,t1,t2,rem,xPpub,yPpub,tmp;
unsigned char *Z=NULL;
int Zlen=IDlen+1,buf;
ecn2 dEB;
epoint *Ppub; h1=mirvar(0);t1=mirvar(0);
t2=mirvar(0);rem=mirvar(0);tmp=mirvar(0);
xPpub=mirvar(0);yPpub=mirvar(0);
Ppub=epoint_init();
dEB.x.a=mirvar(0);dEB.x.b=mirvar(0);dEB.y.a=mirvar(0);dEB.y.b=mirvar(0);
dEB.z.a=mirvar(0);dEB.z.b=mirvar(0);dEB.marker=MR_EPOINT_INFINITY; Z=(char *)malloc(sizeof(char)*(Zlen+1));
memcpy(Z,ID,IDlen);
memcpy(Z+IDlen,hid,1); buf=SM9_H1(Z,Zlen,N,h1);
if(buf!=0) return buf;
add(h1,ke,t1);//t1=H1(IDA||hid,N)+ks
xgcd(t1,N,t1,t1,t1);//t1=t1(-1)
multiply(ke,t1,t2); divide(t2,N,rem);//t2=ks*t1(-1) //Ppub=[ke]P2
ecurve_mult(ke,P1,Ppub); //deB=[t2]P2
ecn2_copy(&P2,&dEB);
ecn2_mul(t2,&dEB); epoint_get(Ppub,xPpub,yPpub);
big_to_bytes(BNLEN,xPpub,Ppubs,1);
big_to_bytes(BNLEN,yPpub,Ppubs+BNLEN,1); redc(dEB.x.b,tmp);big_to_bytes(BNLEN,tmp,deB,1);
redc(dEB.x.a,tmp);big_to_bytes(BNLEN,tmp,deB+BNLEN,1);
redc(dEB.y.b,tmp);big_to_bytes(BNLEN,tmp,deB+BNLEN*2,1);
redc(dEB.y.a,tmp);big_to_bytes(BNLEN,tmp,deB+BNLEN*3,1); free(Z);
return 0;
} /****************************************************************
Function: SM9_Key_encap
Description: Key encapsulation
Calls: MIRACL functions,zzn12_init,ecap,member,zzn12_pow,SM9_H1,
SM3_KDF,LinkCharZzn12,zzn12_ElementPrint,
Called By: SM9_SelfCheck()
Input:
hid:0x03
IDB //identification of userB
rand //a random number K lies in [1,N-1]
Ppubs //encryption public key
Output:
C //cipher
K //Key
Return:
0: success
1: asking for memory error
2: a zzn12 element is of order
3: R-ate pairing generated error
9: K equals 0
Others:
****************************************************************/
int SM9_Key_encap(unsigned char hid[],unsigned char *IDB,unsigned char rand[], unsigned char Ppub[],unsigned char C[],unsigned char K[],int Klen)
{
big h,x,y,r;
epoint *Ppube,*QB,*Cipher;
unsigned char *Z=NULL;
int Zlen,buf,i,num=0;
zzn12 g,w; //initiate
h=mirvar(0);r=mirvar(0);x=mirvar(0);y=mirvar(0);
QB=epoint_init();Ppube=epoint_init();Cipher=epoint_init();
zzn12_init(&g);zzn12_init(&w); bytes_to_big(BNLEN,Ppub,x);
bytes_to_big(BNLEN,Ppub+BNLEN,y);
epoint_set(x,y,0,Ppube); //----------Step1:calculate QB=[H1(IDB||hid,N)]P1+Ppube----------
Zlen=strlen(IDB)+1;
Z=(char *)malloc(sizeof(char)*(Zlen+1));
if(Z==NULL) return SM9_ASK_MEMORY_ERR;
memcpy(Z,IDB,strlen(IDB));
memcpy(Z+strlen(IDB),hid,1);
buf=SM9_H1(Z,Zlen,N,h);
free(Z);
if(buf) return buf;
printf("\n\t**************** H1(IDB||hid,N) ****************\n");
cotnum(h,stdout); ecurve_mult(h,P1,QB);
ecurve_add(Ppube,QB);
printf("\t***********QB:=[H1(IDB||hid,N)]P1+Ppube*********\n");
epoint_get(QB,x,y);
cotnum(x,stdout);cotnum(y,stdout); //-------------------- Step2:randnom -------------------
bytes_to_big(BNLEN,rand,r);
printf("\t***************randnum r: **********************\n");
cotnum(r,stdout); //----------------Step3:C=[r]QB------------------------
ecurve_mult(r,QB,Cipher);
epoint_get(Cipher,x,y);
printf("\t*************** C=[r]QB: **********************\n");
cotnum(x,stdout);cotnum(y,stdout);
big_to_bytes(BNLEN,x,C,1);big_to_bytes(BNLEN,y,C+BNLEN,1); //----------------Step4:g=e(Ppube,P2)------------------------
if(!ecap(P2, Ppube, para_t, X, &g)) return SM9_MY_ECAP_12A_ERR;
//test if a ZZn12 element is of order q
if(!member(g, para_t, X)) return SM9_MEMBER_ERR; printf("\t***************g=e(Ppube,P2):********************\n");
zzn12_ElementPrint(g); //----------------Step5:w=g^r------------------------
w=zzn12_pow(g,r);
printf("\t***************** w=g^r:*************************\n");
zzn12_ElementPrint(w); //----------------Step6:K=KDF(C||w||IDB,klen)------------------------
Zlen=strlen(IDB)+BNLEN*14;
Z=(char *)malloc(sizeof(char)*(Zlen+1));
if(Z==NULL) return SM9_ASK_MEMORY_ERR;
LinkCharZzn12(C,BNLEN*2, w,Z,BNLEN*14);
memcpy(Z+BNLEN*14,IDB,strlen(IDB)); SM3_KDF(Z,Zlen,Klen,K);
free(Z);
//----------------test if K equals 0------------------------
printf("\t*********** K=KDF(C||w||IDB,klen):***************\n");
for(i=0;i<Klen;i++)
{
if(K[i]==0) num+=1;
printf("%02x",K[i]);
}
if(num==Klen) return SM9_ERR_K1_ZERO; return 0;
} /****************************************************************
Function: SM9_Key_decap
Description: Key decapsulation
Calls: MIRACL functions,zzn12_init,ecap,member,Test_Point,
zzn12_ElementPrint,SM3_KDF,bytes128_to_ecn2,LinkCharZzn12
Called By: SM9_SelfCheck()
Input:
hid:0x03
IDB //identification of userB
rand //a random number K lies in [1,N-1]
Ppubs //encryption public key
Output:
C //cipher
K //Key
Return:
0: success
1: asking for memory error
2: a zzn12 element is of order
3: R-ate pairing generated error
4: C is not valid element of G1
9: K equals 0
Others:
****************************************************************/
int SM9_Key_decap(unsigned char *IDB,unsigned char deB[],unsigned char C[],int Klen,unsigned char K[])
{
big h,x,y;
epoint *Cipher;
unsigned char *Z=NULL;
int Zlen,i,num=0;
zzn12 w;
ecn2 dEB; //initiate
h=mirvar(0);x=mirvar(0);y=mirvar(0);
Cipher=epoint_init();
zzn12_init(&w);
dEB.x.a=mirvar(0); dEB.x.b=mirvar(0);dEB.y.a=mirvar(0);dEB.y.b=mirvar(0);
dEB.z.a=mirvar(0); dEB.z.b=mirvar(0);dEB.marker=MR_EPOINT_INFINITY; bytes_to_big(BNLEN,C,x);
bytes_to_big(BNLEN,C+BNLEN,y);
epoint_set(x,y,0,Cipher);
bytes128_to_ecn2(deB,&dEB); //----------Step1:test if C is on G1-----------------
if(Test_Point(Cipher)) return SM9_NOT_VALID_G1; //----------Step2:calculate w=e(C,deB)-----------------
if(!ecap(dEB, Cipher, para_t, X, &w)) return SM9_MY_ECAP_12A_ERR;
//test if a ZZn12 element is of order q
if(!member(w, para_t, X)) return SM9_MEMBER_ERR; printf("\n\t***************w=e(C,deB):********************\n");
zzn12_ElementPrint(w); //----------Step3:K=KDF(C||w'||IDB,klen)------------------------
Zlen=strlen(IDB)+BNLEN*14;
Z=(char *)malloc(sizeof(char)*(Zlen+1));
if(Z==NULL) return SM9_ASK_MEMORY_ERR;
LinkCharZzn12(C,BNLEN*2, w,Z,BNLEN*14);
memcpy(Z+BNLEN*14,IDB,strlen(IDB));
SM3_KDF(Z,Zlen,Klen,K); //----------------test if K equals 0------------------------
printf("\t*********** K=KDF(C||w||IDB,klen):***************\n");
for(i=0;i<Klen;i++)
{
if(K[i]==0) num+=1;
printf("%02x",K[i]);
}
printf("\n");
if(num==Klen) return SM9_ERR_K1_ZERO; free(Z);
return 0;
} /****************************************************************
Function: SM9_SelfCheck
Description: SM9 self check
Calls: MIRACL functions,SM9_Init(),SM9_GenerateEncryptKey(),SM9_Key_encap,
SM9_Key_decap
Called By:
Input:
Output:
Return: 0: self-check success
1: asking for memory error
2: element is out of order q
3: R-ate calculation error
4: test if C is on G1
5: base point P1 error
6: base point P2 error
7: Encryption public key generated error
8: Encryption private key generated error
9: K equals 0
A: cipher error in key encapsulation
B: key to be encapsulated
C: key generated by decapsulation
Others:
****************************************************************/
int SM9_SelfCheck()
{
//the master private key
unsigned char KE[32] =
{0x00,0x01,0xED,0xEE,0x37,0x78,0xF4,0x41,0xF8,0xDE,0xA3,0xD9,0xFA,0x0A,0xCC,0x4E,
0x07,0xEE,0x36,0xC9,0x3F,0x9A,0x08,0x61,0x8A,0xF4,0xAD,0x85,0xCE,0xDE,0x1C,0x22}; unsigned char rand[32]={0x00,0x00,0x74,0x01,0x5F,0x84,0x89,0xC0,0x1E,0xF4,0x27,0x04,0x56,0xF9,0xE6,0x47,
0x5B,0xFB,0x60,0x2B,0xDE,0x7F,0x33,0xFD,0x48,0x2A,0xB4,0xE3,0x68,0x4A,0x67,0x22};
//standard datas
unsigned char std_Ppub[64]=
{0x78,0x7E,0xD7,0xB8,0xA5,0x1F,0x3A,0xB8,0x4E,0x0A,0x66,0x00,0x3F,0x32,0xDA,0x5C,
0x72,0x0B,0x17,0xEC,0xA7,0x13,0x7D,0x39,0xAB,0xC6,0x6E,0x3C,0x80,0xA8,0x92,0xFF,
0x76,0x9D,0xE6,0x17,0x91,0xE5,0xAD,0xC4,0xB9,0xFF,0x85,0xA3,0x13,0x54,0x90,0x0B,
0x20,0x28,0x71,0x27,0x9A,0x8C,0x49,0xDC,0x3F,0x22,0x0F,0x64,0x4C,0x57,0xA7,0xB1};
unsigned char std_deB[128]=
{0x94,0x73,0x6A,0xCD,0x2C,0x8C,0x87,0x96,0xCC,0x47,0x85,0xE9,0x38,0x30,0x1A,0x13,
0x9A,0x05,0x9D,0x35,0x37,0xB6,0x41,0x41,0x40,0xB2,0xD3,0x1E,0xEC,0xF4,0x16,0x83,
0x11,0x5B,0xAE,0x85,0xF5,0xD8,0xBC,0x6C,0x3D,0xBD,0x9E,0x53,0x42,0x97,0x9A,0xCC,
0xCF,0x3C,0x2F,0x4F,0x28,0x42,0x0B,0x1C,0xB4,0xF8,0xC0,0xB5,0x9A,0x19,0xB1,0x58,
0x7A,0xA5,0xE4,0x75,0x70,0xDA,0x76,0x00,0xCD,0x76,0x0A,0x0C,0xF7,0xBE,0xAF,0x71,
0xC4,0x47,0xF3,0x84,0x47,0x53,0xFE,0x74,0xFA,0x7B,0xA9,0x2C,0xA7,0xD3,0xB5,0x5F,
0x27,0x53,0x8A,0x62,0xE7,0xF7,0xBF,0xB5,0x1D,0xCE,0x08,0x70,0x47,0x96,0xD9,0x4C,
0x9D,0x56,0x73,0x4F,0x11,0x9E,0xA4,0x47,0x32,0xB5,0x0E,0x31,0xCD,0xEB,0x75,0xC1};
unsigned char std_K[64] =
{0x4F,0xF5,0xCF,0x86,0xD2,0xAD,0x40,0xC8,0xF4,0xBA,0xC9,0x8D,0x76,0xAB,0xDB,0xDE,
0x0C,0x0E,0x2F,0x0A,0x82,0x9D,0x3F,0x91,0x1E,0xF5,0xB2,0xBC,0xE0,0x69,0x54,0x80};
unsigned char std_C[64] =
{0x1E,0xDE,0xE2,0xC3,0xF4,0x65,0x91,0x44,0x91,0xDE,0x44,0xCE,0xFB,0x2C,0xB4,0x34,
0xAB,0x02,0xC3,0x08,0xD9,0xDC,0x5E,0x20,0x67,0xB4,0xFE,0xD5,0xAA,0xAC,0x8A,0x0F,
0x1C,0x9B,0x4C,0x43,0x5E,0xCA,0x35,0xAB,0x83,0xBB,0x73,0x41,0x74,0xC0,0xF7,0x8F,
0xDE,0x81,0xA5,0x33,0x74,0xAF,0xF3,0xB3,0x60,0x2B,0xBC,0x5E,0x37,0xBE,0x9A,0x4C}; unsigned char hid[]={0x03},*IDB="Bob";
unsigned char Ppub[64],deB[128],C[64],K[32],K_decap[32];
big ke;
int tmp,i;
int Klen=32; mip=mirsys(1000, 16);
mip->IOBASE=16;
ke=mirvar(0);
bytes_to_big(32,KE,ke); tmp=SM9_Init();
if(tmp!=0) return tmp; printf("\n*********************** SM9 密钥产生 ***************************");
tmp=SM9_GenerateEncryptKey(hid,IDB,strlen(IDB),ke,Ppub,deB);
if(tmp!=0) return tmp;
if(memcmp(Ppub,std_Ppub,64)!=0)
return SM9_GEPUB_ERR;
if(memcmp(deB,std_deB,128)!=0)
return SM9_GEPRI_ERR; printf("\n\t**************主加密私钥 Ppubs=[ke]P1：*****************\n");
for(i=0;i<64;i++)
{if(i==32) printf("\n");
printf("%02x",Ppub[i]);}
printf("\n\t******用户加密私钥 deB = (xdeB, ydeB)：*************\n");
for(i=0;i<128;i++)
{ if(i==64) printf("\n");
printf("%02x",deB[i]);} printf("\n\n///////////////////SM9密钥封装机制//////////////////////");
tmp=SM9_Key_encap( hid,IDB,rand, Ppub, C, K,Klen);
if(tmp!=0) return tmp; if(memcmp(C,std_C,64)!=0)
return SM9_ERR_Encap_C;
if(memcmp(K,std_K,Klen)!=0)
return SM9_ERR_Encap_K; printf("\n\n///////////////////SM9密钥解封装机制//////////////////////");
tmp=SM9_Key_decap(IDB, deB, C,Klen,K_decap);
if(tmp!=0) return tmp; if(memcmp(K_decap,std_K,32)!=0)
return SM9_ERR_Decap_K; return 0;
}
完整代码见github
参考
1、国标—SM9-密钥封装
2、密码学-基础理论与应用（李子臣著）
3、商用密码检测中心-源码下载
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